University of Miami Law Review
Volume 70
Number 1 Volume 70 Number 1 (Fall 2015)

Article 10

10-1-2015

Death by a Thousand Cuts: How the Supreme Court Has
Effectively Killed Campaign Finance Regulation by Its Limited
Recognition of Compelling State Interests
Kevin R. Huguelet

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Kevin R. Huguelet, Death by a Thousand Cuts: How the Supreme Court Has Effectively Killed Campaign
Finance Regulation by Its Limited Recognition of Compelling State Interests, 70 U. Miami L. Rev. 348
(2015)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol70/iss1/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

Death by a Thousand Cuts: How the
Supreme Court Has Effectively Killed
Campaign Finance Regulation by Its
Limited Recognition of Compelling State
Interests1
KEVIN R. HUGUELET*
This Article examines the current campaign finance jurisprudence in the United States, with a particular emphasis on
the Court’s recognition of compelling state interests. Given
the limited recognition of compelling state interests, this Article seeks to question the seemingly arbitrary rationale behind recognition and explore the implications of minimal acceptance of compelling state interests. Because the evolution
of compelling state interest recognition has varied greatly,
the Court’s recent insistence — that the state has merely one
compelling interest — is troublesome. This Article provides
a comprehensive review of the campaign finance jurisprudence, then reviews the decisions that created or argued for
additional compelling state interests. Interests that were
considered compelling prior to Citizens United, such as the

* B.A. 2012, Creighton University; J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Miami
School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Frances R. Hill for her invaluable
feedback and assistance throughout the writing of this Comment.
1
During oral arguments in the case of Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S.Ct. 2806 (2011), Justice Breyer characterized the state
of campaign finance regulation as nearly dead. He said, “It is better to say [campaign finance regulation is] all illegal than to subject these things to death by a
thousand cuts, because we don’t know what will happen when we start tinkering
with one provision rather than another.” See Adam Liptak, Justices Review Arizona Law on Campaign Financing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/us/politics/29scotus.html?_r=0.
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anti-distortion interest, remain compelling and hold an important place in the US campaign finance landscape. This
Article attempts to respond to the current Court’s trend and
shed light on the history of compelling state interest recognition.
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INTRODUCTION
As a child, most evenings I sat on the couch with my parents to
watch the news. At best, nightly news in Chicago can be described
as depressing. However, the most unnerving news segments were
those displaying elected officials as they marched into court to stand
trial for some form of corruption.2
In Illinois, more than 1,800 individuals were convicted for public corruption from 1976 to 2012.3 This bleak reality breeds a sense
of skepticism and distrust among the electorate,4 especially for those

2

In the interest of space, this will be only a partial listing of the group:
George Ryan and Rod Blagojevich (Governors); Medrano Ambrosio, Allan
Streeter, Jesse Evans, and Virgil Jones (Alderman). See, e.g., DICK SIMPSON ET
AL., UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI. DEP’T OF POLITICAL SCI. & ILL. INTEGRITY INITIATIVE
OF THE UNIV. OF ILL. INST. FOR GOV’T AND PUB. AFFAIRS, CHICAGO AND ILLINOIS,
LEADING THE PACK IN CORRUPTION: ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT NUMBER 5 4
(2012),
http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/leadingthepack.pdf?sfvrsn=2
[hereinafter
ANTI-CORRUPTION
REPORT NUMBER 5].
3
Id.
4
A recent poll found that nearly ninety percent of registered Illinois voters
believed that political corruption by state government employees was at least
“somewhat common.” PAUL SIMON PUB. POLICY INST. AT S. ILL. UNIV.
CARBONDALE, THE SIMON POLL, SPRING 2014: ILLINOIS STATEWIDE 20 (2014),
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individuals—such as myself—who grew up watching these criminals plunder the state coffers. Generally, Illinois corruption takes the
form of bribery, extortion, conspiracy, or fraud;5 however, other
forms of corruption such as patronage, nepotism, and clout have
plagued Illinois throughout the years.6 The difficulty in fighting corruption is the fact that it is a by-product of Illinois’ political culture,
and the only effective remedy that voters have is through the ballot
box. However, the current trend of campaign finance deregulation—
along with the reality that higher campaign spending correlates to
successful results7—ensures that the people of Illinois are doomed
to endure the exploitation perpetuated upon them for over 150
years.8
Problems of political corruption in Illinois are merely an example of larger issues nationwide. Perhaps the issues described above
have imprinted upon voters a Hobbesian perception of human nature,9 which is misplaced. However, it is difficult to deny that the
real implications of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence have fostered an environment where elected officials are more
responsive to money than they are to their constituents. The unwillingness of the Court to examine the realities of the campaign finance
landscape—in the name of First Amendment protection—calls into
question the efficacy of the social contract10 entered into through the
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=ppi_statepolls. Over half of all interviewed respondents believed that corruption by state
government employees was “very common.” Id.
5
ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT NUMBER 5, supra note 2, at 3.
6
UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI. DEP’T OF POLITICAL SCI., PATRONAGE, CRONYISM
AND CRIMINALITY IN CHICAGO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: ANTI-CORRUPTION
REPORT NUMBER 4 2 (2011), http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/anticorruptionreport_4.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
7
Domenico Montanaro et al., Money Is Pretty Good Predictor of Who Will
Win Elections, PBS THE MORNING LINE (Nov. 11, 2014, 9:17 AM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/money-pretty-good-predictor-will-winelections/.
8
ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT NUMBER 5, supra note 2, at 2.
9
“I put for a generall [sic] inclination of all mankind a perpetuall [sic] and
restlesse [sic] desire of Power after power, that ceaseth [sic] onely [sic] in Death.”
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 49 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1914).
10
“[T]hat a man be willing, when others are so too . . . to lay down this right
to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would
allow other men against himselfe.” Id. at 67.
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Constitution. Because of the significant protections for political
spending, the right of the people to debate and elect the most qualified representatives is infringed.11 When the people are not effectively represented and lose interest in political participation, then the
advantages of government disappear and the social contract is no
longer sensible.
This Comment will review the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence with a particular emphasis on the recognition of legitimate
compelling state interests. Because a restriction on political speech
is an infringement upon the First Amendment, the Court must find
a compelling state interest for the restriction to be constitutional.12
Part I provides the background of campaign finance law and how it
evolved throughout the years. Part II includes a discussion about the
only compelling state interest recognized by the Court, which is prevention of quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.13 In Part III,
the focus will shift to the anti-distortion compelling state interest,
which was recognized in Austin14 and subsequently overruled in Citizens United.15 Part IV suggests a new way forward in the campaign
finance jurisprudence, including a manner in which these decisions
can be integrated. Finally, the article will conclusion and some final
thoughts.
I. AND QUITE SUDDENLY, WORDS BEGIN TO LOSE THEIR
MEANING16
The story of federal campaign finance regulation began—as all
good stories do—in an earlier time. In the first federal attempt to
11

This statement is premised on the assumption that a functional democracy
requires an intense vetting process of political candidates, and the vetting process—campaigning—is interfered with when a miniscule percentage of the population can control the forum for political speech.
12
See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
13
See infra Part II.
14
See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
15
See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
16
This is a rather unclever adaptation of Confucius’s wise words: “When
words lose their meaning, people lose their freedom.” See Barry Lynn, When
Words Lose Their Meanings: The Bishops, Religious Liberty and Dubious Definitions, AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (May
2012),
https://www.au.org/church-state/may-2012-church-state/perspective/when-words-lose-their-meanings.
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limit the influence of money in campaigns, Congress passed the Tillman Act in 1907 with the intention of preventing corporations from
directly contributing to federal campaigns.17 This legislation reflected the American people’s desire to hold elections that were
“free from the power of money.”18 Born during an age of expanding
protections granted to corporations by the Supreme Court, Congress
passed the Tillman Act to curb realistic fears that corporations could
simply buy politicians to do their bidding.19 However, the Tillman
Act alone was insufficient and, in the subsequent decades, the
amount of money in politics increased exponentially.20 In response,
Congress enacted three additional laws in order to fight the influence
of money in politics.21
In the wake of the Watergate scandals,22 Americans clamored
for increased campaign finance regulation, and in 1974 Congress
passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments

17

See Colin Cox, Comment, Protecting Free Speech After Citizens United:
Why Overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce Violates the First
Amendment and Encourages Corruption in Campaigns, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 339,
343 n.24 (2013) (“The resulting 1907 statute completely banned corporate contributions of ‘money . . . in connection with’ any federal election.”) (quoting
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003)).
18
Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts Orchestrated the Citizens United Decision, THE NEW YORKER, May 21, 2012,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/money-unlimited.
19
See id. Henry Clay Frick, a steel baron, once glibly described President
Theodore Roosevelt’s shameless appeal for campaign contributions prior to Roosevelt’s work in passing the Tillman Act. Frick said, “He got down on his knees
to us. We bought the son-of-a-bitch and then he did not stay bought.” Id.
20
See id.
21
The legislation enacted was the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, the
Hatch Act of 1939, and the Taft-Hartley Act. Jonathan E. Skrabacz, Note, “Leveling the Playing Field”: Reconsidering Campaign Finance Reform in the Wake
of Arizona Free Enterprise, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 487, 490–91 (2013).
22
The seemingly endless number of “Whatever-gates” suggest that Watergate still impacts the American people over forty years later. This phenomena
is unsurprising when one considers that the original scandal was “a brazen and
daring assault, led by Nixon himself, against the heart of American democracy:
the Constitution, our system of free elections, the rule of law.” Carl Bernstein &
Bob Woodward, Woodward and Bernstein: 40 Years After Watergate, Nixon was
Far Worse than We Thought, WASH. POST, June 8, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/woodward-and-bernstein-40-years-after-watergate-nixonwas-far-worse-than-we-thought/2012/06/08/gJQAlsi0NV_story.html.
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were passed.23 While FECA established much of the existing regulatory structure of campaign finance legislation, its constitutionality
was challenged shortly after its passage in Buckley v. Valeo.24
Below is a detailed background of the campaign finance jurisprudence. This jurisprudence begins with Buckley, as does much of
the contemporary discussion regarding campaign finance. The discussion of the jurisprudence will proceed on a case-by-case basis
because, while campaign finance is a coherent area of law, most of
the cases considered discreet issues that are better suited for individual examination.
A. Buckley v. Valeo Begins the Court’s Current Campaign
Finance Jurisprudence:”If You Start Me Up, If You Start Me Up
I’ll Never Stop”25
In Buckley v. Valeo, a group of individual politicians challenged
FECA on First Amendment grounds, arguing that “limiting the use
of money for political purposes constitutes a restriction on communication violative of the First Amendment.”26 In a long and somewhat confusing opinion,27 the Court attempted to “balance an individual’s First Amendment right to give campaign donations with the
need to prevent corruption of elected officials.”28 Buckley provided
the foundation for the subsequent campaign finance decisions, and
its legacy continues to influence the Court today.29
The FECA statute at issue in Buckley were 18 U.S.C. § 608.30
The Court drew a distinction between contribution and expenditure
23

Toobin, supra note 18.
Id. (“The law imposed unprecedented limits on campaign contributions and
spending; created the Federal Election Commission to enforce the act; established
an optional system of public financing for Presidential elections; and required extensive disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures.”).
25
Generally, Buckley is the starting point for a discussion about campaign
finance. A tribute to the Rolling Stones’ 1981 song seemed as good a way as any
to begin this discussion. ROLLING STONES, START ME UP (Rolling Stones Records) (1981).
26
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11 (1976) (per curiam).
27
See Toobin, supra note 18; Cox, supra note 17, at 344.
28
Cox, supra note 17, at 344.
29
See, e.g., Marc E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, After McCutcheon, 127
HARV. L. REV. F. 373 (2014).
30
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 nn.13–16.
24
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limitations in campaign finance regulations.31 Contribution limits
were held as a permissible restriction of First Amendment rights,32
while the expenditure limits were struck down.33 One expenditure
limitation that the Buckley Court rejected was 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1),
which limited the amount of personal or family money that a candidate could spend on their election.34 The contribution limits were
upheld because the Court held that it was “unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose—to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions—in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification . . . .”35
Perhaps one of Buckley’s most significant propositions is that
money is a form of speech for the purposes of campaign finance
regulations.36 If money is speech, then any type of restriction on
campaign finance, particularly expenditure restrictions, implicates
the First Amendment.37 The Court explained that a “restriction on
the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression . . . .”38
Also, in Buckley, the Court made clear that Congress has the
constitutional authority to regulate federal elections—an issue that
was not in question.39 Instead, the Court determined that the issue in
campaign finance regulation cases is “whether the specific legislation that Congress has enacted interferes with First Amendment
freedoms or invidiously discriminates against nonincumbent candidates and minor parties in contravention of the Fifth Amendment.”40
If there is an interference with First Amendment rights, then the re-

31

See id. at 19–21.
See id. at 29.
33
See id. at 45.
34
See id. at 51–54; id. at 54 (noting that the “ancillary interest in equalizing
the relative financial resources of candidates . . . [was] clearly not sufficient to
justify the provision’s infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights”).
35
Id. at 26.
36
See id. at 19–21.
37
See id. at 11.
38
Id. at 19.
39
Id. at 13 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4).
40
Id. at 14.
32
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striction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster.41 The only recognized
compelling state interest was the prevention of corruption or its appearance.42 The Buckley Court ruled that even “under the rigorous
standard of review . . . the weighty interests served by restricting the
size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient
to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms . . . .”43
B. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the Court’s
Recognition of Anti-Distortion as a Compelling State Interest:
“Oh, You’re My Best Friend”44
Austin was the first instance45 where the Court opined on a restriction of independent expenditures.46 In that case, a corporation
challenged a Michigan law, which prevented corporations from using their general treasury funds for “independent expenditures in
support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in elections for state
office.”47 Under that statute, corporations were allowed to make independent expenditures to candidates for office; however, those expenditures could only be made from a segregated fund, or a political
action committee (“PAC”), used “solely for political purposes.”48

41

Id. at 43–45.
Id. at 26–29.
43
Id. at 29. The decision in Buckley ruled on the constitutionality of expenditure and contribution limits. Expenditure limits were found unconstitutional in
Buckley, and this article does not question the efficacy of that ruling. Instead, this
article will focus primarily on the recognition of compelling state interests as they
apply to contribution and independent expenditure limitations.
44
The importance of the Austin decision to the campaign finance landscape
will be detailed further. However, because of the recognition of anti-distortion as
a compelling state interest, an apt characterization of Austin’s relationship to campaign finance could be that described in the Queen song. QUEEN, YOU’RE MY
BEST FRIEND (Elektra) (1975).
45
Cox, supra note 17, at 347.
46
An independent expenditure is an expenditure “not made at the direction
of, or under the control of, another person and if the expenditure is not a contribution to a committee.” Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
654–55 (1990) (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.206(1) (1979)).
47
Id.
48
Id.
42
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Michigan law recognized—for the first time—the anti-distortion rationale as a compelling state interest.49
The anti-distortion rationale falls within the ambit of preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption because the “regulation
aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s
political ideas.”50 This compelling state interest “does not attempt
‘to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections,’ . . . rather, it ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for political ideas espoused by corporations.”51
While it may seem that this type of compelling state interest is
penalizing corporations for amassing large amounts of money, it is
not. The anti-distortion rationale is simply an attempt to prevent corporations from dominating the forum for political speech with the
assistance of wealth partially attained through state-conferred benefits.52 Corporations are granted special benefits by state laws, including “limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of
the accumulation and distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital . . . .”53 Because of these advantages, corporations were not allowed to use their general treasury funds to influence the outcome of a candidate election.54 Instead, under the Michigan statute, corporations were allowed to make independent expenditures through separate segregated funds.55 The distinction
drawn by the Court was that contributions to segregated funds were
made with an understanding that the money would “be used solely
for political purposes, [so] the speech generated accurately reflects
contributors’ support for the corporation’s political views.”56

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

See id. at 658–62.
Id. at 659–60.
Id. at 658–62 (citations omitted).
See id. at 660.
Id. at 658–59.
See id.
See id. at 660–62.
Id. at 660–61.
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C. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti Otherwise Known as the
First Case Regarding a Taxable Entity: “And the Court Keeps
Runnin’, Runnin’”57
In First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, the Court heard a challenge to a statute which prevented any corporation from making
contributions or expenditures for referendum issues unrelated to that
corporation’s “property, business or assets . . . .”58 While finding
that the statute was unconstitutional, the Court held that the First
Amendment does not allow the government to restrict speech based
on the corporate identity of a speaker.59 The Court was particularly
disturbed by the statute in question60 because, in effect, it enabled
the state to “regulate the subjects about which persons may speak
and speakers who may address an issue of public concern.”61 Although this case ostensibly stands for the proposition that the state
cannot differentiate between speakers based on identity—which
Bellotti stated62—one consequential portion of Bellotti was a limiting footnote from the opinion. Footnote 26 stated, “Congress might
well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.”63

57

The Court’s movement onward without overturning any campaign finance
precedent, regardless of the different restrictions or entities concerned, may have
been the inspiration for the Black Eyed Peas song. BLACK EYED PEAS, LET’S GET
IT STARTED (Interscope) (2004).
58
See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978).
59
See id. at 784.
60
See id. at 784–85.
61
Cox, supra note 17, at 346.
62
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784.
63
Id. at 788 n.26 (emphasis added).
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D. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n and the Short-Lived
Implications for Campaign Finance: “Like a Sunset Dying with the
Rising of the Moon, Gone too Soon”64
After the turn of the century, Congress attempted to strengthen
campaign finance laws by closing existing “loopholes.”65 Most significantly, Congress sought to curb the explosion of soft money and
electioneering communications, which followed the Buckley decision, by passing the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of
2002 (“BCRA”).66 BCRA was later challenged in McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n.67
The McConnell Court considered Title I of BCRA, which restricted soft money.68 Soft money was unrestricted before BCRA
and “permitted corporations and unions, as well as individuals who
had already made the maximum permissible contributions to federal
candidates, to contribute ‘nonfederal money’—also known as ‘soft
money’—to political parties for activities intended to influence state
or local elections.”69 Also, the Court examined electioneering communications,70 which were permitted because Buckley held that
FECA should only be interpreted to include “election-related activity containing ‘express advocacy[]’ . . . .”71 Express advocacy is limited to television or radio ads that specifically say to vote for or
against an individual.72 Whereas electioneering communications are
broadcasts, which are aired within a specific period of time before
an election and target at least 50,000 individuals, that clearly identify a candidate for federal office.73 The Court held that the state

64

Although the McConnell decision could not have motivated the 1993 song
by Michael Jackson, its short-lived life certainly fits the song. MICHAEL JACKSON,
GONE TOO SOON (Epic Records) (1993).
65
See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109
MICH. L. REV. 581, 588–89 (2011).
66
See, e.g., id.; Cox, supra note 17, at 349.
67
See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
68
Id. at 132.
69
See id. at 123.
70
Id. at 189–90.
71
See Hasen, supra note 65, at 589.
72
See, e.g., id.
73
Electioneering communications are those that meet the criteria and do not
expressly say to vote for or against a candidate. See McConnell, 549 U.S. at 194.
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interest was compelling74 and reaffirmed Austin.75 However, in their
separate opinions, Justices Thomas and Kennedy planted the seeds
for what would become the Citizens United decision.76
The McConnell decision had significant implications on the
campaign finance jurisprudence because it “set forth a democratic
framework and a public participation agenda which addressed the
threat arising from corruption and the appearance of corruption.”77
The underlying justification for the McConnell decision’s impact
was that Congress had authority to oversee the campaign finance
landscape and “to legislate in this area to curtail abuses and thereby
protect the integrity of the democratic system.”78 Although the majority decision in Wisconsin Right to Life (“WRTL II”) would later
reject this democratic integrity framework,79 the McConnell majority and the WRTL II dissent fiercely defended the framework and the
role that Congress plays in regulating campaign finance.80 The essence of the democratic integrity framework is to “identif[y] the activity as financing political speech and the issue as enhancing public
participation and government responsiveness by preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.”81 Whereas the political speech
framework, which was set forth in WRTL II, “defines the activity as
political speech and the issue as burdening, banning or prohibiting
political speech.”82
One important inconsistency, which the Court had yet to decide
definitively, was whether the state could restrict speech based on a
speaker’s identity.83 Before Austin, the Court “forbade restrictions
on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity . . . .”84
74

See Cox, supra note 17, at 350.
Hasen, supra note 65, at 589.
76
See Cox, supra note 17, at 351–52.
77
Frances R. Hill, Corporate Political Speech and the Balance of Powers: A
New Framework for Campaign Finance Jurisprudence in Wisconsin Right to
Life, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV., 267, 269 (2008) (citing McConnell, 540 U.S.
at 205).
78
Id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115–22).
79
Id.; FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2686 (2007).
80
See Hill, supra note 77, at 269.
81
Id. at 272.
82
Id.
83
See id. at 353.
84
Id.
75
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However, after the Austin decision, the Court appeared to allow such
distinctions.85
E. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n and the Court’s
Somewhat Surprising Decision to Overturn Decades-Long
Precedent: “To Everything: Turn, Turn, Turn”86
Between the decisions in Buckley and Citizens United, the
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence “swung like a pendulum toward and away from deference[]” for the compelling state interests.87 However, it was not until Citizens United that the Court was
prepared to overturn any of its campaign finance precedent.88
Citizens United89 marked a distinct shift in the Court’s campaign
finance jurisprudence.90 This decision was polarizing, and many
Americans had an opinion about the consequences of the case.91 The
holding overturned Austin and partly overruled McConnell.92 Much
of the uproar among Americans focused on the implications that this
decision had on corporate campaign spending;93 however, the more
far-reaching consequence of the decision was the narrowing of the
definition of corruption—the only accepted compelling state interest—to the “risk of quid pro quo transactions involving campaign
contributions directly to candidates for office.”94 “[T]he immediate
85

See id.
Such a marked change like Citizens United brings to mind the classic song
by The Byrds. THE BYRDS, TURN! TURN! TURN! (Colombia Records) (1965).
87
Hasen, supra note 65, at 586.
88
See id.
89
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
90
Although his comments were applied in a different context, almost certainly Justice Breyer would agree that his words apply to Citizens United: “It is
not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much.” Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/washington/01scotus.html?pagewanted=all.
91
This decision was so divisive that protests about the decision were held at
courthouses around the United States, including on the steps of the Supreme
Court, to mark Citizens United’s second anniversary. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Citizens United v. FEC Decision Proves Justice is Blind—Politically, POLITICO (Jan.
25, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71961.html.
92
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.
93
Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1,
14 (2012).
94
Id. at 3–4.
86

362

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:348

and dramatic policy consequence of Citizens United was that federal
prohibitions on corporate sponsorship of campaign speech in the
form of electioneering communications and independent expenditures, as well as similar prohibitions modeled after federal law in
roughly half the states, were suddenly unconstitutional.”95 As the
Court reversed the decades-long expansion of its definition of corruption,96 the Court also rejected Austin and part of the McConnell
decision, both of which rested upon the anti-distortion rationale.97
The federal law at issue in Citizens United was BCRA, which
“prohibited corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as
an ‘electioneering communication.’”98 The Court characterized this
prohibition as “a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact
that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak.”99 PACs are
separate organizations established for the purpose of raising and
spending money in candidate elections.100 The Court explained its
statement by saying that “the PAC exemption . . . does not allow
corporations to speak” because “PACs are burdensome alternatives;
they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.”101 Granted, there are additional requirements placed on a
PAC in reporting and administering the organization; however,
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97
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319.
98
Cox, supra note 17, at 354 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320–21);
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100
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101
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these are hardly burdensome enough to justify the Court’s holding.102 Also, the majority in Citizens United defined corruption very
narrowly.103 The Court said that the compelling state interest of preventing corruption and its appearance, set forth in Buckley, was
“limited to quid pro quo corruption.”104
The Citizens United Court upheld the disclaimer and disclosure
requirements of BCRA; the Court explained that these requirements
burden speech, but “impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities . . . .”105 Further, the disclaimer and disclosure requirements satisfy a “governmental interest in ‘provid[ing] the electorate with information’ about the sources of election-related spending.”106
In a spirited dissent, Justice Stevens attacked the majority’s
characterization that BCRA banned corporate speech.107 Stevens
made clear that the PAC requirement is not a ban on corporate
speech, but rather a regulation that provides corporations with “a
constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in express advocacy.”108 Also, while acknowledging that there is some administrative burden on corporations that establish PACs, Justice Stevens recognized that the burden is not severe and is similar to the disclaimer
and disclosure requirements, which the Court upheld.109
The dissent also disputed the majority’s insistence that identitybased restrictions are not permitted by the First Amendment.110 In
fact, “[t]he Government routinely places special restrictions on the
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speech rights of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces,
foreigners, and its own employees.”111
Finally, the dissent addressed the compelling state interests at
issue in Citizens United. Stevens rejected the narrow definition of
corruption applied by the majority because “the difference between
selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, not kind.”112
The dissent defended the anti-distortion rationale.113 Although “Austin can bear an egalitarian reading,”114 Justice Stevens rejected the
majority’s claim that it is “an ‘equalizing’ ideal in disguise.”115 Instead, the dissent contended that the anti-distortion rationale is
“simply a variant on the classic governmental interest in protecting
against improper influences on officeholders that debilitate the democratic process.”116
F. The Progeny of Citizens United: “Yesterday, All My Troubles
Seemed So Far Away”117
The rationale underlying the Citizens United decision has been
applied to campaign finance cases since the ruling. One such case
was McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, which challenged aggregate contribution limits.118 The statute at issue in McCutcheon
provided two separate sets of limits on individual contributions to
candidates or committees.119 The first was base limits, which “restrict[] how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee.”120 The second—which was at issue in this
case—were aggregate limits that “restrict[] how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees.”121 The
111
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113
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114
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notice the application of these lyrics to the campaign finance jurisprudence following Citizens United, especially because the quartet’s ballad continued with
“Now it looks as though they’re here to stay, Oh, I believe in yesterday.” THE
BEATLES, YESTERDAY (Capitol Records) (1965).
118
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
119
See id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
112

2015]

DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS

365

base limits were not challenged because the Court “previously upheld [them] as serving the permissible objective of combatting corruption.”122 The rationale behind the aggregate limits was to prevent
circumvention of the base limits; however, the Court rejected this
because the aggregate limits “do little, if anything” to prevent corruption and held the aggregate limits a violation of the First Amendment.123
Before rejecting the aggregate limits, the Court identified the
purported state interest to determine if it was compelling.124 The
McCutcheon plurality defines corruption narrowly as limited to quid
pro quo corruption or its appearance.125 The plurality cites Buckley,
along with Citizens United,126as standing for this proposition127 even
though, in reality, Buckley did not define corruption.128 Because the
Court applied the narrow definition of corruption, the government
needed to prove that the aggregate limits were narrowly tailored to
prevent circumvention of the base limits. Aggregate limits had been
accepted since Buckley, when the Court identified them as “no more
than a corollary” of base limits.129
The Court identified the necessity of aggregate limits in Buckley
because they prevented a person from “contribut[ing] massive
amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute
to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political
party.”130 However, the McCutcheon Court rejected the idea that the
aggregate limits prevented circumvention and dismissed the hypothetical circumvention measures of the dissent131 as impossible
given the current statutory regime.132
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After Citizens United, the narrow definition of corruption has
opened the door for challenges to the few remaining campaign finance measures.133 This state of campaign finance jurisprudence
leaves Americans with only one relatively rare protection of catching a politician or contributor with their hand in the proverbial
cookie jar.
II. PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION: “ONE IS THE LONELIEST NUMBER
THAT YOU’LL EVER DO”134
Since Buckley, the only compelling state interest accepted by the
Court regarding campaign finance regulations has been preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption.135 Over the years, under
the Rehnquist Court,136 the definition expanded to permit a wider
range of regulations, including contribution limits,137 restrictions on
corporate and union spending,138 prohibitions on soft money,139 and
anti-distortion.140 This definition was turned on its head by the Citizens United decision, which greatly narrowed the expanded definition.141
The Citizens United decision limited corruption as a compelling
state interest only to quid pro quo corruption.142 In support of this
definition, Justice Kennedy—author of the Citizens United majority
opinion—cited his own dissent in McConnell.143 Justice Kennedy
wrote that elected officials who are under the influence of or providing access to certain speakers have not committed corruption.144 He
further explained, “[f]avoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable
133
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in representative politics.”145 The Court’s narrowing of the definition of corruption has put the efficacy of campaign finance regulations in jeopardy.
III. ANTI-DISTORTION: “TWO CAN BE AS BAD AS ONE, IT’S THE
LONELIEST NUMBER SINCE THE NUMBER ONE”146
The anti-distortion interest was recognized as a compelling state
interest in Austin and later rejected in Citizens United.147 As discussed above, the only recognized compelling state interest in the
post-Citizens United campaign finance landscape is quid pro quo
corruption or the appearance of such corruption.
A. Which Way Does Buckley Actually Cut?
The anti-distortion interest has been assailed by the Court recently as a concept that has long been rejected by the First Amendment.148 The Citizens United149 and McCutcheon150 opinions quoted
Buckley as standing for this rejection proposition. It is true that the
Court in Buckley spoke critically of “equalizing the relative ability
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections . . . .”151 The Court said “the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment . . . .”152
However, the Citizens United and McCutcheon decisions crucially fail to mention that this statement about equalizing speech was
made during Buckley’s discussion of expenditures.153 This discussion about the lack of an interest was not discussed in the section of
145

Id. (citation omitted).
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Citizens United decision and, along with anti-corruption, these interests stood
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the Buckley decision dedicated to contribution limits.154 In fact, the
Court easily accepted the contribution limits as a constitutionally
permissible restriction of the First Amendment.155 Further, the Court
explained that this equalizing interest is unconstitutional because the
First Amendment was designed “to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,
and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of political and social changes desired by the people.”156 The antidistortion interest is not at odds with the purpose of the First Amendment. In fact, it encourages a wider variety of speech by preventing
a small number of entities or individuals from dominating the forum
for speech.
B. An Argument for Anti-Distortion
In the interest of transparency—although it may already be
clear—this author supports the recognition of anti-distortion as a
compelling state interest. Also, in the interest of further transparency, the difficulties in recognizing this interest are readily apparent.
Since the decision in Buckley, the Court has been clear that infringements on a person’s First Amendment rights in order to equalize the
ability of another to speak are “wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . .”157 Thus, the first element to consider is whether there is
a difference between anti-distortion and equalizing the ability to
speak.158 Next, there is legitimate debate regarding whether or not
the anti-distortion rationale is truly an interest proceeding from the
anti-corruption state interest.159 Finally, there are issues relating to
the different treatment of corporations and individuals.160 Admittedly, these are hard distinctions to draw. Perhaps that is the reason
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the government essentially abandoned its defense of the anti-distortion interest during oral argument in Citizens United.161 However,
regardless of this difficulty, distinctions do exist and this article will
attempt to draw them below.162
1. IS ANTI-DISTORTION ACTUALLY LEVELING THE PLAYING
FIELD?
Although equalizing speech and anti-distortion ostensibly appear to be different concepts, the lines blur when one begins to think
about these distinctions. The majority in Citizens United seemed to
think that the anti-distortion rationale is simply a disguised version163 of the equalizing interest rejected in Buckley.164 However,
the dissent defends anti-distortion as “simply a variant on the classic
governmental interest in protecting against improper influences on
officeholders . . . .”165 With these two different viewpoints, it appears to be a matter of interpretation as to what Austin really means
by “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form . . . .”166
Because the equalizing interest was rejected in Buckley,167 any
attempt to expand the definition of corruption had to avoid any implication of an attempt to equalize the ability to speak. The Austin
Court was careful to avoid any implications that the anti-distortion
interest “rel[ied] on a speech-equalization rationale . . . .”168 However, following the Citizens United decision, the Court refused to
accept the anti-distortion rationale because it “ban[s] political
speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken

161
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on the corporate form.”169 Regardless of the fact that corporations
could still speak through PACs,170 the Court reiterated that the government does not have an interest in “equalizing the relative ability
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.”171
One definition of “distort” is “twist[ing] out of the true meaning
or proportion.”172 So, for the purposes of campaign finance, antidistortion effectively means to bring things into proportion. The definition of “equalize” is “to make equal” or “to compensate for.”173
Thus, by definition, by putting two things into proportion, someone
is equalizing those things to some extent.
Leaving aside the similarities between anti-distortion and equalizing, there are important differences between the two. Most notably, the anti-distortion interest is not attempting to make the voices
of speakers equal.174 Rather, in Austin, the anti-distortion interest
was said to prevent corporations from dominating the forum for political speech with the assistance of the benefits that those corporations receive through the corporate form.175 Anti-distortion falls in
line with the democratic integrity framework laid down in
McConnell, which was grounded in the idea that campaign finance
regulation was necessary for the integrity of both elections and the
public policy process.176 The integrity framework targets campaign
finance laws on those selling or buying votes and influence; however, the objective of the framework is to “ensure opportunities for
participation by ordinary individuals, including the right of individuals to form organizations to amplify their voices in public policy
debates and in election campaigns.”177 Anti-distortion is simply a
prevention measure, not an equalization measure.178 It does not suggest that any certain number of people need to speak at the same
169
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volume; instead, the anti-distortion rationale prevents one person or
group from shouting so loud that nobody else can be heard.
Also, the anti-distortion rationale—as held in Austin—is limited
to corporations, and therefore has no effect on actual speakers.179
There is no risk of the government attempting to equalize the ability
of individuals to speak.180 This state interest is strictly limited to artificial entities that can distort the political discourse for their own
gain.181 Corporations are created for the purpose of making
money.182 A corporation’s management would be acting ultra vires
if political spending was not conducted in furtherance of making
profits.183 While individual Americans will generally—and unfortunately—vote with their pocketbooks,184 an individual has the ability
to vote for social issues or the good of the nation if he or she
pleases,185 whereas a corporation cannot. In effect, the anti-distortion interest is merely a preventative measure against artificial persons serving their own interests to the detriment of society as a
whole.
Finally, although equalizing may not be in line with the purpose
of the First Amendment, anti-distortion fulfills its intent. One of the
reasons that the freedom of speech clause was included in the First
Amendment was “to foster democratic self-government . . . .”186 In
Buckley, the Court recognized a “societal aspect of the First Amendment by prescribing an ‘electorate-centered’ analytical approach
179

See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 394 (2010)
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whereby ‘the relationship between First Amendment rights and
campaign finance should be structured in a way that best serves the
electorate.’”187 By rejecting this traditional society-centered approach, the Court “prioritized individual speech over societal interests.”188 While critics note the difficulty for a court to draw the line
between societal interests and individual speech,189 consideration of
the “countervailing societal interests in a First Amendment analysis”
is essential.190
The rights of every individual to speak should be respected, as
guaranteed by the First Amendment.191 However, the legal fiction
that money equals speech should not preclude the Court from considering the harm that deregulation of campaign finance may have
on society as a whole.
The First Amendment was put in place to allow and encourage
individuals to speak their minds.192 In order to further protect the
First Amendment, the anti-distortion rationale was recognized by
the Court to ensure that certain favored persons did not dominate the
forum for speech.193 Although this rationale has been rejected in recent years, it cannot be rejected as an equalizing principle because
the two are actually quite different.194
2. IS THE ANTI-DISTORTION INTEREST A COMPONENT OF THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION INTEREST?
Because the only legitimate compelling state interest can be the
prevention of corruption or its appearance,195 the Court needed to fit
the anti-distortion rationale into the anti-corruption interest.196 In
187
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Citizens United, the Court rejected the anti-distortion rationale as an
impermissible corollary to the anti-corruption interest.197 The Court
maintained that the anti-distortion interest was really an equalization
rationale in disguise.198 However, the Citizens United dissent maintained that the “antidistortion rationale is itself an anticorruption rationale, tied to the special concerns raised by corporations.”199 A
firm decision on this issue would go a long way in determining the
validity of the anti-distortion interest.
The debate surrounding the acceptance of the anti-distortion rationale as an anti-corruption interest has grown since the decision in
Austin.200 This is partly because the Buckley Court gave no firm definition of corruption.201 This section will include a brief discussion
of Justice Stevens’s defense of the anti-distortion interest in Citizens
United, the reasons why anti-distortion is not part of the anti-corruption interest, and why that should not matter.
In his Citizens United dissent, Justice Stevens attempted to make
the anti-distortion and anti-corruption interests coherent; however,
he was unable to do so.202 From the beginning of the dissent, he denied that there is any difference between anti-corruption and antidistortion—as applied to corporate spending—because both are
based on preventing improper influence on public officials.203 Then,
Justice Stevens began to make arguments that are unrelated to quid
pro quo corruption or undue influence, which suggests that “his
equation of anticorruption and antidistortion was incorrect . . . .”204
Justice Stevens’s dissent went on to argue “that corporations deserve
less First Amendment protection than humans, that corporate spending can ‘drown out’ the voices of non-corporate interests, that corporate spending can undermine voter confidence in our democracy,
197
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198
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199
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200
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and that corporations can act in ways that undermine the efficiency
of government.”205 Upon closer inspection, only one of these arguments—the second—has anything to do with the anti-distortion interest; also, only the third argument even begins to implicate the
anti-corruption interest.
Justice Stevens, along with other justices and legal commentators,206 has struggled to fit the anti-distortion rationale within the
anti-corruption interest. As evidenced above, it is difficult to make
these two rationales, which the Austin Court held to be intertwined,
cohere.
The Austin Court maintained that the anti-distortion interest
“aim[ed] at a different type of corruption in the political arena” than
anti-corruption.207 According to Austin, anti-distortion was concerned with the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for
the corporation’s political ideas.”208 The Court was most concerned
with political speech “reflect[ing] actual public support for the political ideas espoused . . . .”209
The problem with reconciling the anti-distortion rationale and
the anti-corruption interest is the initial characterization of anti-distortion in Austin. After parsing the language of the opinion, the antidistortion rationale is not a component of the anti-corruption interest; rather, anti-distortion is a separate, freestanding interest.210 Regardless of the explanation or support that a proponent of the antidistortion interest may provide, it is truly a stretch of the imagination
to argue that anti-distortion is simply an anti-corruption measure.
Distortion of political discourse does not present the danger of corrupting public officials, at least not to the extent that justifies infringement on the First Amendment. Therefore, this article comes to
the same conclusion as the Citizens United and McCutcheon Courts:
anti-distortion is not a legitimate component of the anti-corruption
compelling state interest.
205
206
207
208
209
210
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However, should any of the discussion included in this section
actually matter? In short, no. Regardless of all the paragraphs above,
all the opinions and dissents, and all of the law review articles, none
of this discussion about whether anti-distortion is a legitimate rationale for the anti-corruption interest should matter. Because after
thinking through the issues surrounding campaign finance, it is apparent that there is more than one compelling interest that a state has
in its elections.211
The current compelling state interest definition is limited solely
to preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, which completely neglects access and undue influence on public officials.212
But does the state have any other interest in elections? Is a state’s
desire to have widespread voter participation and engagement inappropriate? Can a state attempt to foster an environment where a
broader percentage of the population can be heard without receiving
the title “Big Brother”? These are legitimate questions to ask when
the future of the American Republic rests upon elections, which are
protected by a single interest recognized nearly forty years ago in
Buckley.213
States have many interests in their elections, and the prevention
of public-official corruption—along with its appearance—is but a
single interest.214 Anti-distortion is another. Anti-distortion is an interest for the reasons discussed by the Austin Court,215 but not because this interest prevents corruption. This interest is compelling
because it fulfills the purpose of the First Amendment, which is to
encourage and allow a wide variety of people to speak.216 The antidistortion interest achieves this goal by requiring corporations to go
through the proper channels in order to speak.217 Those channels,
i.e., establishing a PAC,218 do not even require the state to decide
whether or not the speech can be heard. A corporation can speak as
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214
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216
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See id. at 512–15.
See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
See Kang, supra note 93, at 2–4.
See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam).
See supra note 48–49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 50–51 and accompanying text.
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freely as it would like, so long as the money that it is using to fund
the speech is obtained for the purpose of speaking.219
The campaign finance landscape has changed dramatically over
the years,220 and the laws regulating this arena need to change as
well. Perhaps Justice Holmes said it best in the first expression of a
living constitution221 when he wrote:
When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States,
we must realize that they have called into life a being
the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It
was enough for them to realize or to hope that they
had created an organism; it has taken a century and
has cost their successors much sweat and blood to
prove that they created a nation.222
The meaning of the First Amendment, like the rest of the Constitution, has changed over the centuries. While there may have been
no anti-distortion compelling state interest in 1915, one hundred
years later, America is a different place. Many corporations hold
vast assets, which—if unchecked—could control the outcome of
elections.223 The anti-distortion interest is a partial recognition of the
change in the American landscape and an attempt to protect the authenticity of the electoral process. The anti-distortion interest is not
a corollary to the anti-corruption interest.224 It is simply another interest that the state legitimately has in its political discourse.

219

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
221
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), quoted in Justice William
H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, Address at the University of
Texas School of Law Annual Will E. Orgain Lecture (Mar. 12, 1976), in 29 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 402.
222
Id.
223
See Super PACs, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php (last visited July 26, 2015).
224
See supra Part III.B.2.
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3. SHOULD CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS BE TREATED
DIFFERENTLY?
Because of the structure of the legal system in the United States
and the comprehensive nature of campaign finance jurisprudence,
the rationale for one decision could have a major outcome on a
seemingly unrelated matter. For instance, the narrow definition of
corruption set forth in Citizens United helped craft the decision in
McCutcheon.225 Therefore, the rationale for restricting the speech of
a corporation could be applied to a different situation: limiting an
individual’s political speech. This section will first discuss the easier
issue of how the anti-distortion interest applies to corporations.
Then, this section will examine the more difficult matter of how this
could apply to individuals.
The majority in Citizens United was particularly concerned with
chilling the speech of a corporation based solely on the speaker’s
identity.226 The Court worried that individuals could make extensive
independent expenditures while “certain disfavored associations of
citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the same political speech.”227 Here, the Court
failed to recognize that campaign finance regulations on corporations are not restrictions on the individuals who comprise those corporations.228 Every employee of a corporation, from the CEO to the
janitor, could individually speak with no restrictions. Further, the
corporation itself could speak, so long as its speech was voiced at a
reasonable volume and through PACs.229 The only restrictions that
campaign finance regulations impose are on the corporate person.
The idea that a corporation is a person is a legal fiction.230 Instead

225
Citizens United was a case regarding corporate independent expenditures,
whereas McCutcheon dealt with aggregate contribution limits for individuals. See
supra notes 98, 121 and accompanying text.
226
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010).
227
Id. at 356.
228
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
229
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
230
See Eric Posner, Stop Fussing Over Personhood: Laws Treat Corporations
(and Chimpanzees) as Persons Because It’s a Useful—and Often Essential—Legal Fiction, SLATE MAG. (Dec. 11, 2013, 10:09 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/12/personhood_for_corporations_and_chimpanzees_is_an_essential_legal_fiction.html (“The legal fiction
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of blindly protecting the rights of artificial entities, the Court should
focus on protecting the First Amendment rights of individuals as the
Amendment originally intended.
Also, the Citizens United dissent suggests that “large corporate
spending could ‘marginalize[]’ the opinions of ‘real people’ by
‘drowning out . . . non-corporate voices.’”231 Another problem with
the distortion of permitting unfettered corporate speech is that it
“‘can generate the impression that corporations dominate our democracy’ and give corporations ‘special advantages in the market
for legislation.’”232 Admittedly, support for the anti-distortion rationale is more difficult to make when realizing that it could be applied to individuals as well. This difficulty could be avoided completely if, upon recognizing anti-distortion as a compelling state interest, the Court explicitly stated that it did not apply to actual people. However, it may not be altogether unwise to apply the anti-distortion interest to individuals as well.
The First Amendment is perhaps the most sacred sentence233
recorded in American history because of the governmental tyranny
it stands against.234 The Citizens United Court recognized this and
said, “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power, the First
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or
viewpoints. . . . Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.”235 This article will not attempt, nor would its author ever suggest, that these words do not ring true for pure speech; however,
when considering the legal fiction that individuals are as free to fill
that corporations are persons helps courts prevent people from evading, or losing
opportunities from, laws that are too narrowly written.”).
231
Hasen, supra note 65, at 603 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
232
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 470–71, quoted in Hasen, supra note 65, at
603.
233
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
234
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Marquis de Lafayette (Nov. 4, 1823),
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FGEA-chron1820-1823-11-04-1 (“[T]he only security of all is in a free press. [T]he force of
public opinion cannot be resisted, when permitted freely to be expressed. [T]he
agitation it produces must be submitted to. [I]t is necessary, to keep the waters
pure.”).
235
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (citation omitted).
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politicians’ pockets as they are to speak their thoughts, a divergence
of opinion occurs. It must be constantly reiterated that campaign finance regulations concern currency and not the ability of an individual to speak his or her mind.236 For example, regulations on campaign finance do not prevent an individual from speaking in support
of or opposition to a candidate at a social gathering, political rally,
or even in a publication. These regulations are solely concerned with
the amount of money that the individual may dole out to support that
candidate or any other.
A democracy cannot effectively function when the chain of
communication between the people and their elected representatives
is broken.237 The Court’s recent jurisprudence on campaign finance
has obliterated that chain of communication by allowing a small
number of wealthy individuals and groups to hijack the forum for
speech.238 For example, Sheldon Adelson—a name familiar to observers of campaign finance and the Forbes list of the 400 Richest
Americans—contributed nearly $100 million during the 2012 election cycle.239 In advance of the 2016 Presidential Election, at least
four presidential hopefuls beseeched Adelson for contributions in
what political commentators have dubbed the “Sheldon Primary.”240
Further, in Florida’s recent unsuccessful referendum issue regarding
medical marijuana legalization, Adelson contributed eighty-five
percent of the funding to the leading anti-legalization organization.241 These facts are not intended to single out Mr. Adelson or
236

See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
“Where enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be heard.”
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). The First Amendment provides protection for the chain of communication to remain intact, which allows the electorate and representatives to communicate between elections. Id. at 1467–68. Thus, representatives can remain responsive to the people whom they are elected to represent. Id.
238
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of
Law, Lecture During a Constitutional Law Class (Spring 2014).
239
See Matea Gold & Philip Rucker, Billionaire Mogul Sheldon Adelson
Looks for Mainstream Republican Who Can Win in 2016, WASH. POST, Mar. 25,
2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/billionaire-mogul-sheldon-adelson-looks-for-mainstream-republican-who-can-win-in2016/2014/03/25/e2f47bb0-b3c2-11e3-8cb6-284052554d74_story.html.
240
See id.
241
Only fifteen percent of the anti-legalization campaign funding came from
the State of Florida, and that funding came from around eighty individuals in all.
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imply that his opinion is any less important than another American’s; however, these points illustrate that our political process has
been subverted by a small percentage of the electorate.
Why should presidential candidates fawn over an individual donor? Why should a referendum issue in Florida be so heavily influenced by a single person in Nevada? In the face of such a bleak reality, the Court’s position that it is simply protecting First Amendment rights loses credence. The rationale behind the anti-distortion
interest is that no single individual should dominate the forum for
political speech.242 Not every American’s voice will ever be equal
or relatively equal, and perhaps that is not an inherent harm. But, at
the same time, a few individuals should not be allowed to control
the American political discourse solely because they have money.243
Justice Scalia would likely rebut these arguments with his simple
phrase, “the more speech, the better.”244 However, that would only
be true if the forum for political speech were infinite; in reality, the
forum for speech is finite and limited to the weeks and months before an election.245 Further, an increase in the amount of speech is
only beneficial if that speech comes from different sources and
viewpoints.246
Finally, an individual does not need money to speak. None of
this discussion has anything to do with pure speech or speech that
does not involve the spending of money.247 There are alternate forms
of political speech that do not require campaign contributions or independent expenditures. One such obvious example is pure speech
in a public forum, which is reminiscent of the United States Revolutionary Period, but there are others. For example, social media
See Niraj Chokshi, Casino Billionaire Sheldon Adelson is Behind 85 Percent of
Florida’s Anti-Pot Campaign, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/10/28/casino-billionaire-sheldon-adelsonis-behind-85-percent-of-floridas-anti-pot-campaign/.
242
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
243
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
244
Matt Vasilogambros & Sarah Mimms, Scalia Defends Citizens United Decision, Reflects on Term in Rare TV Appearance, NAT’L J., July 18, 2012,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/scalia-defends-citizens-united-decisionreflects-on-term-in-rare-tv-appearance-20120718.
245
Iglesias, supra note 238.
246
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
247
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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does not require money and, in today’s interconnected society, it is
effective for political speech.248 While the likes of Kim Kardashian
may pay private firms in an attempt to break the internet, a vast majority of social media users may express their opinions free of charge
to influence massive social dialogue and change.
In order to ensure that the purpose of the First Amendment is
realized—”to secure ‘the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources[]’”249—perhaps it is
necessary to curtail the spending of a few wealthy individuals.
IV. A “NEW” WAY FORWARD
Like most other quasi-geeky law students, an appreciation of legal history and the evolution of law is not lost on the author of this
Comment. Further, this article does not suggest that stare decisis250
should be abandoned. However, the reality is that Americans live in
a brave new world,251 where devices carried in one’s pocket have
more computing power than the computers that landed astronauts on
the moon.252 Elections have also changed. The total spending for all
major party House candidates in the 1976 election was $60 million;
in the 2012 election, the total spending for all major party House
248
Any skeptic about the effectiveness of social media on political discourse
ignores the Arab Spring and recent politicized police killings in the United States.
See, e.g., Catherine O’Donnell, New Study Quantifies Use of Social Media in Arab
Spring,
UW
TODAY,
Sept.
12,
2011,
http://www.washington.edu/news/2011/09/12/new-study-quantifies-use-of-social-media-in-arabspring/; Emanuella Grinberg, What #Ferguson Stands for Besides Michael Brown
and
Darren
Wilson,
CNN,
Nov.
19,
2014,
10:36
AM,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/19/us/ferguson-social-media-injustice/.
249
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
250
Stare decisis is Latin for “to stand by things decided.” Stare Decisis,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). It is the “doctrine of precedent, under
which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise
again in litigation.” Id.
251
Perhaps a comparison between the United States and Aldous Huxley’s
‘World State’ is inappropriate, but that is a discussion for another time. However,
it cannot be denied that the world today is a far different place than the one that
existed when Buckley was decided in 1976. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW
WORLD (HarperCollins Publishers 2006).
252
NASA, DO-IT-YOURSELF PODCAST: ROCKET EVOLUTION (2009),
http://www.nasa.gov/audience/foreducators/diypodcast/rocket-evolution-indexdiy.html.
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candidates was $923 million.253 The point is that with the extreme
changes that have occurred in the election landscape perhaps a reexamination of the campaign finance jurisprudence is warranted—particularly certain premises unexamined since they were put forth in
Buckley. Also, a recommitment to the robust enforcement and passage of laws could solve many issues that face the campaign finance
jurisprudence.
A. Reexamination of Campaign Finance Jurisprudence
1. DOES MONEY EQUAL SPEECH?
One of the widely accepted progeny of Buckley that should be
reexamined is the idea that money is speech.254 This is a largely rejected concept by supporters of campaign finance regulation.255 The
rationale behind First Amendment protection for political spending
is reasonable. In Buckley, the Court recognized that a restriction on
political spending de facto reduces the quantity, depth, and size of
any desired expression.256 Therefore, campaign finance restrictions
must pass constitutional muster in order to stand because they are an
infringement on First Amendment rights.
However, within this discussion it must not be forgotten that the
restrictions, which campaign finance regulations target, are on
spending.257 Although money is speech, it is a special category of
speech different from the pure speech258 that the First Amendment

253

Also, the average amount spent per candidate increased from $73,316 in
1976 to $1,178,004 in 2012. CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., HOUSE CAMPAIGN
EXPENDITURES: MAJOR PARTY GENERAL ELECTION CANDIDATES, 1974–2014
(2012), http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/vital/VitalStats_t2.pdf.
254
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
255
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, ON POLITICAL CORRUPTION, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 118, 118 n.2 (2010) (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Money is property; it is not speech.”)).
256
Further, the Court recognized that “virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.” Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17–20 (1976) (per curiam).
257
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
258
Although even Buckley’s justification for money as a protected form of
expression was premised on the fact that “virtually every means” of mass communication in 1976 required the expenditure of money, perhaps this has changed
in the forty years since the decision. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17–20.
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was originally designed to protect.259 The idea that money equals
speech—while valid—is a legal fiction.260 The current trend of campaign finance decisions since Citizens United grants more protection
to this legal fiction than to pure speech. This fact is particularly troubling as applied to corporations—whose ability to speak is also a
legal fiction—because it stacks legal fiction upon legal fiction to the
detriment of society as a whole.261
Contrary to the Court’s current First Amendment interpretation,
there are numerous instances where the government is allowed to
restrict the First Amendment rights of a speaker.262 Further, all of
these instances limit pure or symbolic speech. So, if a principal can
regulate her students’ off-campus support of “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS,”263 then why is Congress prevented from regulating the billions of dollars paid to candidates for public office?
An interesting aside, which cannot be resolved by the current
commitment to an absolute interpretation of the money-equalsspeech fiction, concerns those who do not have money. If money
equals speech, then can those without money speak?264 The Buckley
Court noted that “[t]he First Amendment’s protection against governmental abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made
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See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
“Legal fiction” is defined as “[a]n assumption that something is true even
though it may be untrue, made esp. in judicial reasoning to alter how a legal rule
operates . . . .” Legal Fiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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Iglesias, supra note 238.
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substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent”); Miller v. California, 413
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to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public discussion.”265 Thus, how can First Amendment protection unquestioningly extend to a category that is completely dependent on an individual’s financial ability to speak?
In reality, the concept that money equals speech is logical. However, an absolute acceptance of this concept without consideration
that it is a legal fiction, which recent Court decisions seem to indicate, is troublesome.
2. DOES THE STATE HAVE AN INTEREST IN EQUALIZING SPEECH?
Another unexamined premise from the Buckley decision was
that the state does not have an interest in equalizing the political
sphere.266 The Court’s statement, which attempts to equalize the
ability of speakers to influence elections are “wholly foreign to the
First Amendment,” was dicta.267 Further, the cases that were discussed as support for this concept dealt with statutes, which required
or prevented newspapers from supporting or opposing candidates
for election.268
Admittedly, it does seem foreign to the First Amendment to limit
the ability of one speaker to enhance the ability of others to speak.
However, given the current campaign finance landscape, perhaps
that is what the First Amendment requires. As discussed above,269
the anti-distortion interest is similar to leveling the playing field.
However, one key difference is that the anti-distortion interest is
concerned with preventing an individual or group from dominating
the forum for political speech, which is not necessarily attempting
to make all speakers equal.270 Therefore, it seems to fulfill the purposes of the First Amendment, which the Buckley Court described
as “secur[ing] ‘the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources . . . .’”271
It is possible that the Buckley Court’s statement about leveling
the playing field is as true today as it was in 1976. However, the
265
266
267
268
269
270
271

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam).
See id. at 48–49.
See id.
See id. at 50–51.
See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (citations omitted).
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anti-distortion interest is a middle ground between the two approaches. This interest maintains the principle from Buckley that the
state is prohibited from equalizing the voices of all speakers. At the
same time, the anti-distortion interest recognizes the real shortcomings of campaign finance law and seeks to correct them.
American voters have become disillusioned with the electoral
process.272 There could be many different explanations for this phenomenon; however, one point of agreement on this issue should be
that the government—and society as a whole—has an interest in
voter participation. One way that voters become engaged in the process is by having candidates who engage the electorate. The democratic integrity framework recognized this reality. Thus, Justice
Souter—in his WRTL II dissent—noted that “[d]evoting concentrations of money in self-interested hands to the support of political
campaigning therefore threatens the capacity of this democracy to
represent its constituents and the confidence of its citizens in their
capacity to govern themselves.”273 The anti-distortion interest is a
way to resurrect the lofty ideals of the democratic integrity framework and support Justice Souter’s opinion that “political integrity . . . [has] a value second to none in a free society.”274 But if
candidates and elected officials are more concerned with fundraising, and massive fundraising becomes a prerequisite for a successful
campaign, then the quality of candidates will change. Instead of
elections composed of candidates with popular political philosophies, ideas, and good merit, American elections will continually
become a race to build massive war chests for campaign funds and
flooding the airwaves with unceasing advertisements. American
voter disillusionment can be seen everywhere, from low voter turnout numbers to popular culture,275 and until the Court recognizes a
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Dylan Stableford, Voter Turnout for 2014 Midterms Worst in 72 Years,
YAHOO! NEWS, Nov. 12, 2014, 9:34 AM, http://news.yahoo.com/voter-turnout2014-midterms-worst-in-72-years-143406756.html (noting that only 36.3 percent
of eligible voters voted in the 2014 midterm elections, which was the worst turnout since the 1942 election).
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state interest—like the anti-distortion interest—that allows Congress to regulate campaign finance, then quality political candidates
will continue to elude the American public.
Although this Comment may seem critical of politicians, which
is certainly deserved in some instances, there is not a lack of appreciation for their difficult position. Because of the current structure
of the campaign finance jurisprudence, politicians are allowed to engage in massive fundraising efforts, and it is only reasonable for
them to do so. However, this reality places a burden on politicians
to actually raise the money and in that pursuit promises may need to
be made to donors. To further complicate matters, any savvy politician fresh off an electoral victory should immediately begin thinking
about the next election. Given the fact that he or she will need to
raise money again, that politician cannot forget the people who put
him or her in office or the fact that those people can give their money
to someone else.
While the state does not have a legitimate interest in equalizing
the speech of all people, it does have an interest in making sure that
everyone has the opportunity to speak. The anti-distortion interest
accomplishes this goal by preventing the domination of the forum
for speech by a relatively small group.
B. Recommitment to Legislation
One question, which looms large over the discussion of campaign finance reform, is how can reform be accomplished?276 Many
people claim that the current trend of deregulating campaign finance
laws has left what remains ineffective, which provides a bleak outlook for campaign finance reform.277 Some interesting approaches
have been suggested to deal with the problems introduced by the
Court’s decisions, which will be discussed below. However, the
most apt approach would be to give teeth to the laws that are already
in place and recognize anti-distortion as its own compelling state
interest.
from grade-school mascot elections to presidential elections, as a choice between—in the interest of civility what I will describe as—Scylla and Charybdis.
South Park: Douche and Turd (Comedy Central television broadcast Oct. 27,
2004).
276
See Kang, supra note 93.
277
See id. at 51.
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Generally, the history of campaign finance regulations has been
concerned with ex ante approaches.278 However, an ex ante approach raises constitutional problems because such a regulation “restricts political speech.”279 One way to avoid this difficulty is to focus instead on ex post regulations, which target the influence of campaign contributions and expenditures after the fact.280 This approach
is attractive because it avoids the constitutional difficulty, while at
the same time targeting the actual corruption that the anti-corruption
interest attempts to prohibit.281 Further, the Court has been sympathetic to this approach in recent cases.282 In Caperton v. Massey, a
judge was recused because a “campaign supporter’s case arrived before the elected candidate.”283 Similar to Caperton, an ex post approach would focus on regulating the actions of public officials once
they are in office. Thus, the ex post approach would reduce the incentive of the official or others to resort to corrupting measures.
The ex post approach is logical and has many attractive components. However, one major flaw with this approach, which it could
not take into account, is the exclusion of a separate anti-distortion
interest. The allure of this approach is, in part, due to the fact that it
could realistically be employed within the current campaign finance
jurisprudence, without overturning any precedent. Given the unlikelihood that the current Court would reverse its trend of narrowing
the scope of campaign finance regulation, perhaps this is the most
reasonable way forward. But that which is reasonable is not always
that which is necessary.
Republican theory284 views public deliberation as an inherent
good in a political system.285 Deliberation is a process of cultivating
civic virtue through political participation and is an end in and of

278

See id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
280
See id. at 55–58.
281
See id.
282
Id. (citations omitted).
283
See Id. at 57.
284
This phrase and the term “republicanism” will be used interchangeably. It
should be noted that these terms refer to the political philosophy and not to the
American political party.
285
See, e.g., Republicanism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Apr.
15, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/republicanism/.
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itself, not a means to improve public policy.286 Republican theorists
view political preferences as endogenous, meaning they are only
formed after public deliberation.287 Without an approach to campaign finance that takes into account the anti-distortion interest,
these republican ideals—to which founding fathers Jefferson and
Madison subscribed288—are lost. The ex post approach is valid and
should be pursued to reinvest in the battle against public official corruption. However, ex ante approaches, such as the anti-distortion interest, are necessary because of their importance to the political process.
As discussed above, the most important new way forward in the
area of campaign finance is a recognition of anti-distortion as a compelling state interest. Recognition of this interest would revitalize
many existing statutes such as FECA and BCRA. This would enable
them to combat corruption and ensure that American elections are
representative of the issues and interests of the American people.
While this recognition would be difficult to achieve, it would be extremely beneficial.
Political discourse was once an ideal aspired to in the United
States. The anti-distortion interest is simply a way of recommitting
to that ideal by allowing Congress to curb the influence that money
has on the outcome of elections. The FECA and BCRA statutes were
attempts by Congress to restrict monetary influence, but the Court
somehow saw this as a way to suppress speech. The Court’s usurpation of the legislature’s role in campaign finance regulation and its
claim of authority for “judicial pre-clearance” is troublesome.289
Further, it flies in the face of Justice Breyer’s words in his Shrink
Mo. Gov’t PAC concurrence that “the legislature understands the
problem—the threat to electoral integrity, the need for democratization—better than do we.”290 Voices can be heard by elected officials
from behind the marble columns of the Supreme Court building, but
for the ordinary American voter, the Court’s rejection of the anti-
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distortion interest is just another erosion of the chain of communication so vital to a functioning democracy.
Elections are essential to a functional democracy, and in order
for elections to capture the will of the people, different viewpoints
must be heard. This is one of the reasons that the First Amendment
was drafted and, in defense of the Amendment’s spirit, it is also one
of the many reasons that the anti-distortion interest should be recognized.
CONCLUSION
Campaign finance is a controversial area of law. It seems that
many people have an opinion on the matter, although few know the
necessary language required to make any sophisticated legal arguments. This fact is evidence that there is a lot at stake and that this
issue is larger than editorials or law review articles. Campaign finance law goes to the heart of how the American people view and
perceive their government. If those people lose faith in their government, then they will not participate in it. Without citizen participation, we risk losing Thomas Jefferson’s dream of the Great American Republic and his words would fall upon deaf ears: “Where every
man is a sharer in the direction of his ward-republic . . . and feels
that he is a participator in the government of affairs, not merely at
an election one day in the year, but every day . . . .”291
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Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816),
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch4s34.html.

